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
software engineering dependability

Efficient Reachability Graph Development for
State/Event Fault Trees


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University of Kaiserslautern

State/Event Fault Trees*

Combines traditional fault trees with state-charts:



* B. Kaiser, C. Gramlich, M. Förster: State/event fault trees - A safety analysis model for software-controlled systems. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Int. Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security, 2007



RG is always finite
because of boundedness
of the underlying DSPN

Dynamic part of the SEFT:*

1a) Build complete state set (Cartesian product): $A \times S \times B$

1b) Filter out invalid states (via unreachable state pairs)

→ **Valid state set**


2) Insert state transitions (link pattern table)

3) Reachability analysis (ensures a valid reachability graph)

→ **Reduced Reachability Graph**

Causal part of the SEFT:*

4) Search hazardous reachability states



Dynamic part of the SEFT:*

- 1a) Build complete state set (Cartesian product): $A \times S \times B$
- 1b) Filter out invalid states (via unreachable state pairs)

➔ possible in case of **direct** triggered event relations

➔ **Valid state set**

- 2) Insert state transitions (link pattern table)
- 3) Reachability analysis (ensures a valid reachability graph)

➔ **Reduced Reachability Graph**

Causal part of the SEFT:*


- 4) Search hazardous reachability states

➔ possible in case of “**Boolean**” state-based gates




Well-formed SEFTs

Dynamic model: Unreachable state pairs



- A.off; S.secondary active
- A.running; S.secondary ...
- A.defect; S.primary active
- S.defect; B.running
- S.defect; B.defect
- S.primary ...; B.running
- S.primary ...; B.defect
- S.secondary active; B.off
- A.off; B.running
- A.off; B.defect
- A.running; B.running
- A.running; B.defect

Valid state set (A x S x B):



Unreachable pairs:

- A.off; S.secondary active
- A.running; S.secondary ...
- A.defect; S.primary active
- S.defect; B.running
- S.defect; B.defect
- S.primary ...; B.running
- S.primary ...; B.defect
- S.secondary active; B.off
- A.off; B.running
- A.off; B.defect
- A.running; B.running
- A.running; B.defect



A.running
S.primary active
B.off

A.defect
S.secondary active
B.running

A.running
S.defect
B.off

A.defect
S.secondary active
B.defect

A.defect
S.defect
B.off



A.fail → B.fail v S.fail → A.fail

		CM	CM ³	FA	FA ⁴	HDS	HDS ²
	Components	4	12	3	12	4	12
	states	13	39	7	28	9	18
	events	19	57	10	40	9	18
state set	Cartesian product	60	216000	9	6561	81	6561
	direct method	35	42875	9	6561	22	484
	traditional method	138	439482	49	125325	248	61504
vanishing states	direct method	0	0	0	0	0	0
	traditional method	103	396607	40	118764	224	61020
generation time	direct method	<10ms	14min	<1ms	13s	5ms	7s
	traditional method	47ms	~6h	16ms	21min	31ms	11min
	memory consumption	~25%	~10%	~18%	~5%	~9%	~1%

FA: Kaiser et al.: State/event fault trees - A safety analysis model for software-controlled systems. 2007

HDS: Yong, Dugan: Modular solution of dynamic multi-phase systems. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Vol 53, 2004

Summary

- Qualitative analysis process of SEFTs
- Well formed SEFTs
- Direct RG development
- Significant improvement of the computation time/memory allocation

Perspectives

- Loosen the restrictions of well-formed SEFTs
- Use the direct method also in case of quantitative analysis